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Abstract 
This paper examines gaps in bank lending and services to SMEs in China, the problem of productive SME-
bank relationships and the reasons behind these gaps. Specifically it distinguishes between lending facilities 
and lending services in order to highlight an imbalance in the current banking context for Chinese SMEs.  
It combines data from Berry (2006) with own matching data in China, drawing on Berger and Udell’s 
(2006) conceptual framework of credit availability. This study adopts stylised comparisons with Germany, 
the UK and the USA, and Hong Kong. The results reveal that China has developed a banking infrastructure 
which is equivalent to comparable developed countries. However China is deficient with regard to the 
quality of bank services. The results are discussed in the context of government policies, the financial 
infrastructure, SME credit availability, and the intricacies of the SME-bank relationship in China.   
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1. Introduction   
 
Since embarking on economic reform and opening in 1978, China has maintained an 
astonishing rate of economic development. Over the decades, China has pursued an 
incremental and experimental approach to its development and transition policy, focusing 
initially on the easiest areas of reform to implement (Dana, 2002). This has meant that some 
major areas of challenging reform have been left incomplete until relatively late and this 
includes banking reform. There has been a significant increase in the numbers of organizations 
offering banking services, e.g. by 2013 banking was diversified with total assets of RMB151 
trillion and 3,747 financial institutions 1  (CBRC, 2013). However, the government still 
ultimately controls the banking sector and interferes in the process of regulation and in 
infrastructure provision. Moreover, despite a formal commitment to encourage the 
development of smaller non-state-owned banks, actual policy still tends to perpetuate the 
dominance of large state-owned banks. This macro environment has had consequences for the 
relation between banking and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in spite of the 
progress that has been made in banking reform.   
 
    In order to explore the consequences for SMEs of this macro environment this paper takes a 
nation-based comparative approach. It adapts data from Berry (2006) and combines this with 
subsequent matching research in China. The comparators are the UK, USA, Germany, and 
Hong Kong. Each provides a different perspective from which to consider issues for China. 
The USA and the UK comprise an Anglo-American approach to governance that has been 
China’s primary benchmark in its formal approach to banking reform. However, the Anglo-
American approach is one rooted in broad and highly liquid capital markets. China shares with 
Germany a more bank dominated financial system. Moreover, German banking is characterised 
by relationship lending, rather than distanced transaction lending, and this can be meaningfully 
compared to Chinese guanxi lending. Finally, Hong Kong provides a useful geographically 
proximate point of intermediate comparison based on the combination of its historically 
derived UK-style banking sector but close commercial, political and cultural connection with 
                                                          
1 Including 3 state policy banks, 5 large/national commercial banks (4 state-owned), 12 joint stock banks, 42 
foreign bank subsidiaries, 144 city commercial banks, 337 rural commercial banks, 2,074 Rural credit 
cooperative banks/credit agents and 1,130 others.   
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China. In summary, the aim of this paper are to identify gaps in China in bank lending and 
services to SMEs.  We will consider the problem of productive SME-bank relationships and  
investigate reasons for the problem, drawing on Berger and Udell (2006)’s conceptual 
framework of SME credit availability concerning the link between government policies and 
national financial structures and the mediation of lending technologies. 
 
    The results reveal that Chinese SMEs now have multiple and diversified bank relationships 
and use a wide range of services provided by different types of banks and interact with those 
banks in a variety of ways. This indicates that China has developed a banking infrastructure 
that is, in terms of its potential for SME support, formally equivalent to comparable developed 
countries. However with regard to the quality of bank services i.e. the competence of bank staff 
and their understanding of SME business, as expressed through SME satisfaction with their 
bank and SME credit availability, China is as yet deficient. These results are placed in the 
context of China’s macro lending environment, with reference to Berger and Udell and related 
subsequent empirical research. 
 
    The structure of the paper proceeds as follows: first, to provide relevant context, the key 
stylised features of the institutional structure and lending infrastructure are briefly set out, with 
reference then to SMEs, of each of the comparator countries; followed by methodology, data 
analysis and further discussion of the issues.   
 
 
 
2. Financial institution structure and lending infrastructure with reference to 
SMEs in the comparator countries  
 
             We provide a brief review of the context of the banking system in each surveyed country 
suggesting that Germany, the UK & USA, and Hong Kong each have certain characteristics 
relevant to China’s financial institutional structure and also lending infrastructure. As such, the 
use of a comparative approach is one that provides significant insight despite that China is in 
some respects also a unique case in terms of bank lending to SMEs and the bank-SME 
relationship.  
 
 
The significance of long term and close banking relationships in the German system  
 
Germany is well known for its export oriented and extraordinarily successful manufacturing 
sector. This sector is founded on quality, reliability, the continual pursuit of product innovation, 
and the use of advanced technology where applicable in the production process. A key 
component in the success of the manufacturing sector is the Mittelstand firms (The Economist, 
2012).2 The Mittelstand are small and medium sized enterprises, often family owned, typically 
with thin management structures but highly technically qualified staff, and where the firms are 
often clustered around a major university, and close to significant larger firms. They thus 
benefit from external economies of scale if they are end-product producers, but also simple 
proximity advantages if they are part of supply chains. The other widely recognized aspects of 
the success of Germany’s Mittelstand are their banking relationships.   
 
                                                          
2 ‘Why doesn’t France have a Mittelstand?’ The Economist, October 20th 2012.  
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    Research on the German banking system and SMEs (Quack and Hildebrandt, 1995; Harhoff 
and Körting, 1998; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001; Krahnen and 
Elsas, 2004; Ongena et al., 2012) consistently reports that SMEs benefit from longstanding and 
personalised relations with a single bank and often a single designated individual or team of 
representatives of that bank – this is typically termed ‘relationship lending’. This relationship 
lending is executed in a context where banks offer finance at relatively low interest rates 
(against a benchmark for comparable contemporary rates in other states) and over long periods. 
So, there is long term bank financing for capital projects, as well as permanently available and 
accommodative overdraft facilities to meet cash flow variations. The net result is a reduction 
in information asymmetry between the bank and the SME, a situation of trust, reducing the 
exposure of the bank to non-performing loans, and simultaneously, providing an enduring basis 
for financial stability as a springboard for business success. As such, the failure rate of SMEs 
in Germany is relatively low by international standards.3 Germany seems to exhibit highly 
developed lending services. Its lending infrastructure is also one with a primary focus on 
banking as a source of productive investment.  
 
    The German banking system has evolved over the decades with some banks following the 
universal model and taking on more commercial roles in capital markets etc. This is delivered 
through a complex web of different varieties of banks on different scales.4 However, the core 
banking actor within the infrastructure is the Hausbank (Housebank), which provides a 
transmission point for government support to SMEs through an available supply of subsidised 
loans and loan guarantees. The Hausbank provides a buffer between the state and lending into 
the economy that mitigates the potential for irrational or non-economically motivated 
distortions in credit rationing. Hausbank pass qualified loan applications to guarantee banks 
(Burgschaftsbanken), or development banks (for example, Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau –
KfW), which are partially funded by the government (Mullineux, 1994) and can carry 
guarantees of up to 85% (Berry, 2006). The Hausbank is the primary source of long term low 
cost lending to SMEs. They also provide additional backstops such as short-term liquidity 
insurance in situations of unexpected deterioration of SME client credit ratings (Elsas and 
Krahnen, 1998).    
 
 
The Anglo-American framework: a capital market context  
 
As in the German system, in the UK and USA SMEs are typically clients of a single primary 
lender and that lender is typically a bank (see Berry et al., 2004; Berry, 2006; Yeung et al., 
2012). However, the nature of the relationship can be contrasted, in a stylised fashion, with that 
in the German case. Whilst some form of relationship lending is not unknown in the Anglo-
American framework, lending to SMEs tends to be for shorter periods at higher interest rates, 
                                                          
3 http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/16344/attachments/13/translations/en/renditions/native, accessed 
29/10/16.  
4 One might describe the overall banking sector as diverse, encompassing commercial banks, savings banks, 
cooperative banks and development banks (Quack and Hildebrandt, 1995; Kakes and Sturm, 2002). The 
commercial bank sector consists of large commercial banks (e.g. Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Dresdner Bank, 
Hypo-Vereinsbank), regional banks, private banks and foreign bank branches. The savings bank sector which 
traditionally acts as public function (e.g. financing local investment) includes the Landesbanks (owned by 
different federal states) and saving banks (owned by local governments) but they are gradually involved in more 
and more commercial activities (Kakes and Sturm, 2002). The credit co-operative sector comprises of many small 
credit co-operatives (owned by individuals or firms) and regional co-operative institutions owned by their local 
credit co-operatives (Kakes and Sturm, 2002).    
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and is characterised as less personalised. The context of lending services differs from the 
German case: lending tends to be standardised and based more on formal credit scoring models 
and banks are more likely to act conservatively in term of balance sheet protection by more 
quickly withdrawing credit, either based on difficulties experienced by the individual SME, or 
based on a general adverse movement in the business cycle. The approach is more observably 
market driven and many decisions are now taken at a level beyond the branch, reducing the 
autonomy of the manager and any lending teams with the specialised task of dealing with 
particular SME clients. There is, for example, more of a focus on managing the breach of 
lending covenants. As such, the failure rate of SMEs tends to be higher in the Anglo-American 
framework. Moreover, developing relations with SMEs is not a primary focus of the banking 
system in the UK and USA.  
 
    As in the German case there have been persistent, though not overwhelmingly successful, 
attempts by the state to encourage financial support for SMEs. For example, two UK-wide 
initiatives have been the Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) scheme and Enterprise Capital 
Funds (ECFs), which provide government loan guarantees and venture capital funds 
respectively.5 In the UK, the SME banking market is best described, based on the dominance 
of the four top tier banks, as a ‘complex oligopoly’ (Heffernan, 2006 p.3109). Most SMEs bank 
with one of the big four and thus rely on high street banking (Hussain et al., 2006). In terms of 
the quality of lending services, many studies over a long period have highlighted serious 
concerns about the difficulties experienced by SMEs in obtaining loans and the dissatisfaction 
of SMEs with their banking relationships (Bolton, 1971; Fletcher, 1994; Cosh and Hughes, 
2000; Collis and Jarvis, 2002; Singh and Kaur 2015). The business cycle sensitivity of lending 
relationships in the Anglo-American framework is also highlighted by research confirming 
general satisfaction with an SME’s main service provider during the credit boom prior to the 
global financial crisis (Fraser, 2004).  
 
    The situation in the USA does exhibit some difference from the UK. The federally initiated 
Small Business Administration (SBA), created in 1953, has provided longstanding continuity 
in terms of institutional support for SMEs. The SBA works with other organisations (such as 
Small Business Investment Companies -SBICs) to aid, counsel, assist and protect the interests 
of small businesses. Empirical studies (OECD, 2003; Hagendorff et al., 2007; Scott and 
Dunkelberg, 2010) consistently suggest that US bank services to SMEs mainly operate at a 
local rather than a national level and that this market/deposit concentration leads to the 
development of long term relationships between banks and SMEs. Smaller banks in particular 
tend to develop ‘relationship lending’ characteristics with SMEs. Whilst acknowledging this it 
remains the case that the Anglo-American framework is quite different from the German 
framework.  
 
 
The hybrid or mixed Hong Kong banking system   
 
Hong Kong provides a useful geographically proximate point of intermediate comparison for 
China. This is because of its historically derived UK-style banking sector but close commercial, 
political and cultural connection with China. Hong Kong is situated on the south coast of China 
next to Guangdong province. Over 90% of Hong Kong’s population are the descendants of 
Cantonese-speaking immigrants, many of whom were refugees from either civil war or 
Communist rule. After the First Opium War (1839–1842), Hong Kong became a colony of the 
                                                          
5 http://www.ukbusinessgrants.org, access 03/07/13. 
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British Empire. It was ruled by Britain from the 19th century until 1997 when its sovereignty 
was returned to China.6 During that period Hong Kong established itself as a commerce port 
between China and the West, and as a corollary, as a centre of finance, initially for trade. As 
such, Hong Kong developed as a site of laissez-faire economy characterised by minimal 
government intervention, low bureaucracy and market competition (Schenk, 2002).  
 
    Hong Kong’s economic infrastructure, political culture and education system are often 
described as hybrid, an “East meets West”.7 China’s government has been particularly careful 
in acknowledging this hybridity, and has treated Hong Kong as a unique case within its newly 
extended borders. On 1st July 1997, Hong Kong returned to China as a special administrative 
region, under the principle of "one country, two systems" (Lin, 2001). The Hong Kong 
Reunification Ordinance (Kwan, 2006), establishes that Hong Kong’s market and banking 
system will remain effectively unchanged. This is part of a developmental strategy in which 
the rest of China is expected to absorb some practices and institutional forms from Hong Kong, 
whilst Hong Kong, in turn, is slowly assimilated with the mainland.  Hong Kong has played a 
main role as a point of transmission for export oriented trade via Guangzhou, during a period 
in which Shanghai in particular has been developed as a complementary site for business and 
finance. As such, the lending facilities and banking services exhibited by Hong Kong’s banking 
system are significant for China in terms of practical interactions and as a source to be emulated. 
All Chinese state owned banks now have branches in Hong Kong, and their assets proportion 
in overall Hong Kong banking assets has increased rapidly in recent years, for example from 
9% in 2009 to 15% in 2013. 8  
 
    Hong Kong has ranked third or fourth in global measures of financial centres for more than 
half century. Three quarters of the world’s hundred largest banks trade in Hong Kong (Lam 
and Burton, 2005). The local financial infrastructure is highly developed across all elements of 
banking and finance, and is also dense (Hong Kong is only 1,104 km2; Kwan, 2006). The 
infrastructure, moreover, encompasses small local banking with long historical antecedents in 
pre-revolutionary China, as well as significant larger organizations that emerged from the 
colonial period (e.g. Hang Seng Bank). Indigenous banks and institutions are popular among 
Cantonese and local firms and serve an important part in the mainstream banking sector.  
 
    SMEs and SME-bank relationships in Hong Kong are under-researched and reported. 
However, it is widely recognized that Hong Kong’s financial sector is significantly influenced 
by its British heritage (Schenk, 2002), and given Hong Kong’s economic, political and cultural 
connections to the mainland, the administrative region can provide a proximate point of 
intermediate comparison between China and the West in terms of lending facilities and banking 
services to SMEs.  
 
    Hong Kong’s banking sector provides SMEs with a wide variety of sources of credit, 
creating choice and some competition. In this sense, the lending facilities are well developed. 
However, unlike the USA and UK, where SMEs tend to be dependent on a single bank in a 
marketized context and the German case where long term relational lending focused around a 
single bank is significant, SMEs are not loyal to a single bank. According to Lam and Burton 
(2005), multiple relationships and frequent switching with low costs between banks are normal 
in Hong Kong and a low proportion (only about a quarter) of SMEs use a single bank. One 
                                                          
6 Except for a short period of Japanese occupation during the Pacific War, 1941-1945. 
7 “24 hours in Hong Kong: Urban thrills where East meets West”, CNN news, March 8, 2009.  
8 “Integration with mainland banking system: the opportunity and challenges Hong Kong banking sector 
facing”, The First Financial Daily newspaper (Diyicaijingribao, China), November 26, 2013.     
 7 
 
might say that the Hong Kong banking sector incorporates some of the features exhibited by 
other banking systems but does so in a unique circumstance. Specifically, switching may be a 
signal of both push and pull factors. It may be a consequence of effective competition based 
on high-quality lending services, terms and conditions. However, it may also be a signal of 
poor quality lending services – a failure of the bank to inculcate loyalty in a context where 
other choices exist. Given the typically high transaction costs involved in shifting between 
banks and given that transaction costs can be more significant for SMEs than larger firms, it 
seems likely (and both research and anecdotal evidence tends to support this) that it is 
dissatisfaction (a push factor), that drives this shifting. As a result, banks may wish to work to 
improve service quality since this is found to have a strong association with the durability of 
the business relationship (Lam and Burton, 2006).       
 
    Hong Kong also shares with Germany, the UK and USA some degree of support by 
government for SME finance. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA, the bank 
regulator) and the Department of Trade and Industry provide significant support in terms of 
funding and business advice to SMEs through four schemes: the loan guarantee scheme, the 
export marketing fund, the training fund, and the development fund. Furthermore, the 
Commercial Credit Reference Agency (CCRA), authorised by the HKMA, gathers SME credit 
information on behalf of the banks, provides SMEs with better access to finance and minimises 
the risk of default (Berry, 2006).   
 
    Despite having historical, political and cultural connections to the mainland, the fundamental 
difference exhibited by the financial system in Hong Kong compared to China is in the aspects 
of ownership and marketization, measured by the extent of government control and 
intervention. In Hong Kong, the government does not control financial resource allocation 
through bank ownership, and banking regulation is kept to a minimum in accordance with the 
tenets of a laissez-faire economy. As such, Hong Kong SMEs do not experience the same 
politically influenced context as mainland SMEs in terms of banking relations. In China, state-
owned banks dominate the lending infrastructure. Moreover, the substantive relations of SMEs 
tend to be different. The phenomenal success of the Chinese economy over the last two decades 
means that today the majority of Hong Kong SMEs are service-oriented firms operating as sub-
contractors to larger organizations in China. China’s SMEs, however, tend to be more closely 
integrated into the supply chains of those larger organizations, and many of those are State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Siu et al., 2006). As such, China SMEs face the simultaneous 
challenge of accessing lending services from a banking context dominated by state-owned 
banks and of dealing with SOE hierarchies. Both may involve non-commercial considerations 
and both mean that political capital (including that expressed in a culturally specific form as 
guanxi, see below) is an important feature of effective business conduct. This can result in 
problems for SMEs in China that are then expressed in the banking services environment.  
 
 
Chinese banking system in the socialist market economy  
 
As noted earlier, China is a unique case in terms of bank lending to SMEs and the bank-SME 
relationship because its banking system operates in a mixed market economy (the socialist 
market economy). It is now distanced from a traditional socialist planned economy but not yet 
a fully realized capitalist market economy. Significantly its banking system is still heavily 
influenced by the state, and particularly through the dominance of the large state-owned banks. 
This characteristic has discriminated against SMEs in terms of the greater priority placed on 
larger organizations by the banks and in terms of the more limited capacity of SMEs to develop 
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relationships with banks that are oriented in this way (Dana, 2013). Superficially, this problem 
seems analogous to that confronted in the UK and US context. However, the reasoning here is 
different: it is the lack of relevant political capital and of guanxi that provides a major constraint 
for SMEs in China. This is a situation that has emerged through historical processes (Dana, 
1999).  
 
    During 1949-78, China was a socialist planned economy. Its banking system mirrored that 
in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) 
acted as a central bank and the main commercial bank. After economic reform began in 1978, 
centrally planned financial resource allocation was gradually reduced and local authorities 
started to have some freedom to decide usage of financial resources. Initial reform also created 
a ‘‘two tier” banking system:  the PBOC, which functioned as a central bank, and four state 
owned commercial banks (SOCBs). 9  In 1986, the first joint equity bank, the Bank of 
Communication (BOCOM) was established, and this was followed by new small and medium 
sized commercial banks mainly in regions and cities to provide localised bank services to firms 
and individuals.10 As such, the lending infrastructure in China has gradually diversified. 
 
    In 1994, an initiative to improve governance in the banking sector was begun. This followed 
significant pressure to normalise China’s banking practices with recognized international 
standards as part of the initial process of applying to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Concomitantly, China came under pressure to liberalise its banking sector and open it up to 
foreign bank participation (Yeung, 2009). China also formally abandoned credit planning for 
the SOCBs in 1998 (Zhang et al., 2012). State-imposed credit allocation systems create a 
potential for distortion in credit rationing, and also serve to maintain the dominance of these 
entities in the provision of bank services. Though formally abandoned the practice has had 
longstanding consequences for SMEs. In principle, however, the choices open to SMEs have 
greatly increased over the last 15 years. All SOCBs have formally adopted similar Anglo-
American type corporate structures and are governed by a Board of Directors. This was 
intended to meet the requirements of a stock market listing. Banks have, as such, become in 
principle more transparent. After 2001 China joined the WTO, and foreign investment in 
China’s commercial banks increased, improving the liquidity of those banks. In 2003, the 
principle of private ownership in the banking sector was finally accepted by the State Council 
(Fu and Heffernan, 2009) and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was 
established to regulate (alongside the PBC) and monitor the banking industry (Berger et al., 
2009).   
 
    The actual situation of SMEs with respect to the availability of credit and the quality and 
availability of banking services is complex (Allen et al., 2005). SMEs are highly dependent on 
bank credit and services because stock and bond markets are as yet underdeveloped, highly 
volatile, and because SMEs lack the scale to meet the typical requirements for listing. Nearly 
90% of firms external funding for SMEs derives from bank loans (Hou and Wang, 2013). As 
such problems within the banking system can cause a wide range of problems for SMEs. The 
Chinese banking system is still significantly influenced by the state. Despite changes, the state 
still holds the majority of equity shares for all SOCBs and thus remains the ultimate owner. 
The state still interferes in the allocation of credit both directly and indirectly as confirmed by 
                                                          
9 i.e. the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the Agricultural Bank of China  (ABC), the Bank of 
China (BOC) and the China Construction Bank (CCB). 
10 this group of new banks includes city commercial banks (CCBs), rural commercial banks (RCBs) and rural 
credit cooperative banks (RCCs) (Fu and Heffernan, 2009), though some of them (e.g. CCBs) largely owned by 
local governments. 
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Hou and Wang (2013), who note that the SOCBs continue to dominate in the system, despite 
growing diversity in terms of infrastructure provision. Moreover, other banks have good 
institutional reasons to mirror the behaviour of the SOCBs. The protection of private property 
rights is as yet historically new and weak. There is also a de facto recognition that scale affects 
political capital and this affects the credit worthiness of an organization on the basis of the 
capacity of that organization to bargain its way out of financial trouble. Furthermore, the credit 
application process remains highly bureaucratic and thus it makes sense to focus on larger scale 
lending as well as larger scale firms. It is, therefore, not unreasonable that all other banks in 
the system tend to also prefer to deal with larger firms and with the SOEs. As such, SMEs 
consistently find it difficult to obtain bank loans (Poutziouris et al., 2002; Podpiera, 2006; Wu 
et al., 2008) and are forced to borrow money at high interest rates via informal lenders (Wu, 
2011). 
 
    There is a clear problem of informality here in terms of the banking system and SMEs. The 
context differentiates Chinese relational lending from German relational lending.  
Discrimination against private firms and weak protection of private property rights worsen 
information asymmetry problems in bank lending to SMEs in China (Zhou, 2009). As a result, 
in order to mobilise critical resources, Chinese SME owners/managers are found to have a 
strong interest in investing in political capital. 11  They do so through joining political 
organisations/networks (Zhang, 2008; Zhou, 2009). This membership can help increase access 
to influential figures such as political elites and bank managers, through their personal 
networks, and a form of relationship lending can be facilitated. Significantly, the relationship 
is one that focuses on power more than it does on the forms of investment to be undertaken. 
Moreover, there is a problem of circularity, only the successful and/or well-connected can 
develop these networks and access its influence. For most ordinary SME owners/managers, 
their political capital investment is constrained to a more direct cultivation of relations with 
specific branch bank officers. SOCBs dominate and have links into the state bureaucracy. So 
SMEs also collude in the reproduction of the power and dominance of SOCBs. As a matter of 
pragmatism SMEs seem to prefer a relationship with SOCBs than with private banks.  
 
    As stated previously, relationship lending in Germany features a long term and stable 
relationship between SMEs and their house banks. This relationship is based on a formal 
contract backed by government legislation and underwritten by the existence of the state in a 
formal and distanced sense, where it is long-term commercial considerations that dominate. In 
contrast, relationship lending in China is often in the form of guanxi lending. Guanxi is a 
difficult cultural concept to translate into a non-Chinese context. It is often defined in Anglo-
American discourse as a form of social network influence or social capital, rooted in traditional 
Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism (Yao and Yueh, 2009). It refers to an informal and 
complex inter-personal relationship, which contains many elements such as mutual 
commitment, loyalty, obligation and trust (Tan et al., 2009). Guanxi ties are commonly 
established among Chinese through dining and gift-given before any written contract is signed 
(Davies, 1995; Wong and Chan, 1999). In many respects it is a substitute for stronger 
dependence on formal law and on specific contracts, though it is also a way of gaining access 
to contractual opportunities. In the current Chinese context a reliance on guanxi may reflects 
institutional weakness (a social aspect), poor development of property rights and contract law 
(an economic aspect) and the motivations of individual personal gain (a psychological aspect). 
Though guanxi is not an alien concept in Hong Kong, it is not of the same order of significance.  
                                                          
11 For example, legislative memberships of Communist Party (CP), the People’s Congress (PC) and the People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (PPCC). 
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The point highlighted here is that not only are SMEs not a major priority for the dominant 
actors in the banking system, they also lack significant guanxi that may enable them to 
challenge that situation. They do, however, have reasons to seek to engage in guanxi relations. 
The transitional nature of the current Chinese banking system differentiates China from the 
German, Anglo-American and Hong Kong banking systems. This kind of hybrid mixtures of 
public ownership and private initiative has developed in a rather different way than the German 
context. It creates the potential for distortions in credit rationing and also in terms of the 
institutional focus for supporting aspects of the economy through supporting potentially 
significant sectors of the business community (Newman et al., 2012; Yeung et al., 2012)12. 
There is also a blurring of the regulator and lender function in so far as the state remains active. 
There is the potential for unequal competition in the banking sector. The state has a vested 
interest in maintaining the solvency of the SOCBs and the SOCBs also have guanxi. As such 
they enjoy preferential access to capital and experience lower interest rates compared to other 
banks in the system.13 This also serves to reproduce a focus on larger SOEs because lending to 
SOEs and to local government are reasons why the SOCBs are systemically significant. 
  
 
3. Research methodology 
 
The primary aim of this study is to explore the status of bank lending services in China to SMEs 
in the context of the comparators. In so doing this study adapts data from Berry (2006) and 
augments this with our own matching research in China.14 We delivered 1,000 questionnaires 
but intended to target 200 SME respondents to match Berry’s respondent numbers in each 
country and finally collected 187 usable questionnaires. The analysis pattern followed that in 
Berry’s work to facilitate comparison (see Tables 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8). One may argue Berry’s 
research was tied with a professional body however it is a standard research approach 
conducted by a professor in a UK university. One may also be tempted to infer that the initial 
2006 data is now dated, reducing the relevance of the subsequent work. However, the point of 
the comparison is to construct a stylised and constructive contrast with contemporary trends in 
China in order to highlight issues in regard of China. As such, changes within the comparators 
since 2006 are largely beside the point. They are, however, noted where relevant.   
 
    The major divergence in method between own and Berry’s work concerns the nature of the 
sample. Berry’s work was based on a randomly selected sample and the questionnaire was 
subsequently executed by telephone. China is geographically highly diverse in terms of 
economic and social development. It has a population of more than 1.2 billion and more than 
50 million SMEs. Given these characteristics any viable small-scale research that applied a 
geographically undifferentiated random sample method ran the risk of being non-representative 
of the population. To adjust for this possibility 3 representative geographies were targeted: 
Beijing (the capital of China representing a highly developed region), Hubei province (in the 
middle of China, representing a developed region) and Yunnan province (in the southwest of 
                                                          
12 For example in the UK, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) which is controlled by the government 
department (the UK Treasury) regulates the financial service sector but the government does not own 
commercial banks excluding some bail-out cases in unexceptional circumstances (e.g. UK government bailed 
out Lloyds and RBS in 2007-09 financial crisis). 
13 For example, by the end of 2009, the four SOCBs had a market share of 51% of total banking assets while 
CCBs and RCCs had 6.6% and 11.5% of respectively. 
14 The data and questions included in Berry’s in relation to Spain and accountants were deliberately excluded in 
this paper to fit its own purpose. 
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China, representing a less developed region). Berry’s questionnaire was then adapted by 
revising and adding questions to reflect China’s regulatory context and personally delivered by 
local researchers in person or by email to owners/managing directors or financial managers of 
SMEs in the sample frame randomly selected from local company yellow pages in 201115, with 
roughly balanced numbers in each regions. The format conformed to China’s firm size 
classifications (designated in 2003)16 and categories of industries.  
 
    The measurement of SME size in other countries generally follows EU guidelines (i.e. below 
250 employees) but categorizations vary in China across sectors. For example, maximum 
employee numbers of SMEs for wholesale are 200 while for construction are 3,000. The 
classification of industries is also different in China and some new categories were added to 
match official regulation and industry importance in the literature. 17  Key information 
comparing Chinese respondents and those aggregated from comparator countries is shown in 
Table 1. Table 1 suggests, in terms of size, 74% of Chinese respondents have employee 
numbers ranging from 50-3,000 whilst 75% of respondents in other countries have a number 
of employees below 50. With regard to industries, the respondents in other countries were 
mainly in production/manufacturing (33%) and wholesale or retail (27%), whilst Chinese 
respondents are spread evenly across sectors. In addition, about half of other countries’ SMEs 
operate locally whilst most of Chinese respondents do business beyond local markets. 
However, the proportion of Chinese SMEs operating across national boundaries is much lower 
than in other countries, 11% of Chinese firms operated internationally compared to 34% of 
those in other countries.  
  
                                                          
15 As noted in the introduction Berry’s data was published in 2006 and was collected before this date. It serves a 
stylised function here and is, as such, not anachronistic. The primary data was collected in 2011. Again, though 
the data is now 4 years old, the context in which it was collected and the insights it provides remain relevant.  
16 http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/PI-c/288809.htm 
17 For example, the information technology industry is increasingly important in China (Xiao, 2011). 
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Table 1: Comparison of demographic data of respondents  
Size measured by turnover Types of industry  
China Others* China Others* 
RMB ¥ % Sterling £ %  %  % 
< 500,000 4 < 50,000 13 Agriculture 2 Agriculture  2 
500,000- 1 million 12 50,000-250,000 22 Production or 
manufacturing 
21 Production or manufacturing 31 
1 million- 5 million 19 250,000-500,000 15 Construction 7 Construction  9 
5 million- 20 million 19 500,000-1 million  11 Wholesale or retail  10 Wholesale or retail  27 
20 million- 50 million 13 1 million- 5 million 17 Catering 9 Catering  2 
50 million- 100 
million 
23 5 million- 10 million  12 Transport or 
communications 
12 Transport or communications  4 
100 million- 3 billion  10 10 million- 25 
million 
10 Finance or insurance  4 Property or finance  5 
Total  100  100 Business services 3 Business services  15 
    Oil or chemicals 14 Public admin, health & 
education 
2 
Size measured by employee numbers  Information technology 14 Personal or leisure services  3 
China Others* Others 4   
 %  % Total  100  100 
Owner only  1 Owner only  4     
1-9 4 1-9 40 Markets in which SMEs operate  
10-19 4 10-19 16 China (main market)  Others*(overlapped) 
20-49 17 20-49 19  %  % 
50-99 19 50-99 10 Local  10 Local  49 
100-249 21 100-249 8 Regional  27 Regional  35 
250-499 14 250-499 3 National  44 National  33 
500-3,000 20   International  19 International  35 
Total  100  100 Total  100   
*Others include UK, USA, Germany and Hong Kong extracted from Berry (2006) and China data from own survey.  
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4. Data analysis  
 
4.1.Survey results categorized by component of the SME-bank relationship 
 
 
Single or multiple relationships 
 
As noted in Section 2, whether SMEs are engaged in single enduring or shifting and multiple 
relationships with banks depends on context (see also Rajan, 1992; Thakor, 1996; Ongena and 
Smith, 2000; Berger et al., 2008; Haas et al., 2010). SMEs in the USA and UK tend towards 
dependency on a single bank for quite different reasons than is the case in Germany, whilst 
SMEs in Hong Kong tend more towards multiple relationships. This research places China 
closer to Hong Kong. Table 2 indicates that, whilst the results for comparators are consistent 
with that in the literature, China has the lowest percentage of single bank relationships (12%) 
and the highest mean in terms of number of banking relationships (3.34).   
 
Table 2: Comparison of number of banking relationships  
Number of banking relationships Average of relationships by country 
 China (%) Others* (%) Country  Single 
relationship (%)  
Mean number of 
relationships 
1 12 44 China  12 3.34 
2 26 19 UK  78 1.37 
3 27 18 USA 66 1.67 
4 12 8 Germany  39 2.15 
5 6 4 Hong Kong  30 1.85 
6-7 9 3    
8+ 9 3    
*Others include UK, US, Germany and Hong Kong and the data from Berry (2006, pages35, 37).  China’s data from own 
survey.   
    One can disaggregate this finding further. In Section 2 it is noted that China’s lending 
infrastructure had gradually diversified. This is reflected in Table 3, which indicates that SMEs 
have, formally at least, access to a wide variety of banks. This is equivalent to the variety 
available in the majority of modern economies. However, it is also noted in Section 2 that 
SOCBs dominate the lending landscape and benefit from privileged access to state support, 
which in turn provides them with a competitive market advantage (in terms of capital and 
interest rates)18 but also creates a sense of privileged access in terms of influence (based on 
guanxi). Table 3 (see also later subsections) supports these claims in so far as it is larger SMEs 
that tend to be clients of SOCBs. Large SMEs, defined as capitalised between Renminbi (RMB) 
50 million and 3 billion, mainly have relationships with SOCBs (41.3%), Additionally Section 
2 suggests other banks tended to emulate the behaviour of the SOCBs and this is confirmed by 
the relative focus of joint-stock commercial banks (44.7%) and foreign banks (77.8%) on the 
larger SMEs. Smaller SMEs, meanwhile, tend to be clients of city commercial banks (42.9%) 
and rural credit cooperatives (41.7%).  As such, the market appears to be informally segregated.  
 
                                                          
18 Politically favoured SOCBs have better banking credit and access to favourable interest rates and as a result 
enjoy higher excess reserves ratios, deposit/loan ratios and lower loan/asset ratios (Jia, 2009). 
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Table 3: Chinese sample banking types by firm size (measured by capital)  
 
Types of banks  
RMB ¥ 
< 5m 
 
RMB¥ 
5m < 50 m 
RMB¥ 
50m < 3 b 
Row  
% 
% within State-owned Commercial Banks  25.7 33.0 41.3 100.0 
% within Joint-Stock Commercial Banks 29.1 26.2 44.7 100.0 
% within City Commercial Banks 42.9 33.8 23.3 100.0 
% within Rural Credit Cooperatives  41.7 29.1 29.2 100.0 
% within Foreign Banks 11.1 11.1 77.8 100.0 
Source: from own survey.   
    However, this situation is not static. The expansion and dominance of SOCBs has resulted 
in blanket coverage. There are SOCB branches/business offices in all cities, counties and towns 
in China (Chong et al., 2013). As such SOCBs now find themselves in locations where they 
are competing with other forms of bank, including city commercial banks and rural credit 
cooperatives. When these branches are physically distant from the headquarters, the holding 
banks may exercise little control, i.e. local branches have some freedom in granting loan 
approvals (Berger and DeYoung, 2001). So although smaller SMEs may not be the priority of 
SOCBs in general, SOCBs can be gradually observed to be extending their coverage across the 
range of SMEs. As set out in Section 2, the SMEs also prefer this relationship, though not 
necessarily for purely commercial reasons (Zhou, 2009; Lu et al., 2012). 
 
    Combining insights from Tables 2 and 3, one might argue that SMEs in China may prefer 
multiple bank relationships in order to maximize credit access and minimize risks of sudden 
credit shortfalls. These reasons might partially explain why Chinese SMEs can, to some extent, 
overcome financial obstacles and cope with an imperfect banking system and maintain growth 
(Zhou, 2009; Yao and Yuch, 2009). However, the current form of the relation privileges the 
large and does so through the continued dominance of the SOCBs. This in turn creates a context 
for how “SOCBs are aggressively improving their services to compete with foreign banks in 
the highly lucrative market of private banking business in China” (Yeung et al., 2012, p.857). 
Despite the influence of joining the WTO, which is increasingly reflected in the lending 
infrastructure, it remains the case that the politics of banking and guanxi continue to 
inadvertently influence the Chinese SME-bank relationship.   
 
Banking services used  
 
Effective bank services provide multiple advantages. In general terms, using the lending 
services and other products of a given bank can enhance the SME-bank relationship. This is 
because communication is concentrated and the bank can become aware of the range of ways 
in which it can be of further service to the SME, further promoting the interchange of 
information and creating synergies that promote the cross-selling of other products and services 
(Santikian, 2014). Where this is effective trust is also created which then promotes enduring 
relations with lower transaction costs, all other things being equal (Morgan and Sheehan, 
2015). Santikian’s (2014) findings suggest that deposit and savings accounts, cash-
management and financial service products are important drivers of a strong firm-bank 
relationship because banks can use information obtained from other cross-sold products to 
monitor borrower accounts (Norden and Weber, 2010). Such a strong relationship can perhaps 
also help both participants survive a crisis (Iyer and Puri, 2012). Furthermore, bank products 
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and services used by SMEs are related to the country’s macroeconomic and financial 
development (Ghosh, 2006). For example, Klapper finds, “factoring is larger in countries with 
greater economic development and growth and developed credit information bureaus” (2006, 
p.3111).   
 
    Table 4 sets out the bank services used by SMEs and suggests that Chinese SMEs have a 
much higher usage of all bank services (excluding a similar usage for current accounts) than 
their international counterparts.  
 
Table 4: Comparison of banking serviced used   
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 % % % % % % % % % % 
China  99 92 91 71 52 52 52 57 54 52 
UK* 98 68 31 11 48 34 19 20 29 11 
USA*  97 61 47 20 25 7 10 8 16 16 
Germany*  97 35 56 15 58 9 3 0 32 5 
Hong Kong* 98 84 49 27 52 74 39 25 27 29 
*Data from Berry (2006, page39) and China data from own survey.    
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    The most significant of these findings are context specific. The significantly high levels of 
access to foreign currency services and international trade services indicate that Chinese SMEs 
tend to be internationally engaged (hence also the figures for Hong Kong, though Germany 
seems anomalous here). 19  The high levels of treasury services and mortgage access also 
indicate that Chinese SME owners also use their businesses as security for property and 
financial assets. This potentially makes banks a high risk if SME bank loans are defaulted. It 
might be one of reasons that Chinese banks have high non-performance loan rate. The relatively 
high uptake in all categories indicates that any potential competition for clients amongst 
Chinese banks is based on a wide variety of potential services, all of which SMEs are keen to 
access. The formal availability of these services again indicates that the lending infrastructure 
in China is now well developed. The quality of services, however, remains at issue. 
 
 
Bank communication channels     
 
In recent years a growing trend has been observed regarding bank’s uptake of new 
communication technologies and platforms (e-mail, internet based service deployment etc). 
From the banks’ point of view, these new communication channels reduce costs and provide 
pathways and systems that enable data collection to promote further services. Their uptake also 
enables banks to reduce or replace more traditional means of communication. However, 
empirical evidence suggests customers do not all, at least initially, share the bank’s interest in 
promoting new communication technologies. The majority of customers exhibit risk concerns 
regarding Internet banking and are suspicious of new technology when first introduced 
(Laukkanen et al., 2008, Grabner-Kräuter and Faullant, 2008). However, the majority of 
Internet banking adopters are middle-aged males with above average incomes, who are also 
well-educated and familiar with technology (Akinci et al., 2004; Ozdemir et al., 2008). In 
China, many SME owners and managers do not fall into this category and one would not, 
therefore, anticipate they would welcome and use new communication channels, in turn, at 
least in a restricted communicative sense, leading to a positive determination regarding the 
development of such banking services.     
 
     Table 5 sets out the communication channels used by SMEs with their banks.  
 
                                                          
19 Note this is a different point than that suggested in Table 1, which refers to multinational operation by SMEs 
rather than their position in supply chains. 
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    The data suggests that Chinese SMEs still favour traditional forms of communication at the 
time of collecting data.20 In particular they still prefer visiting the local branch. One might infer 
from this that the finding reflects the perceived significance of guanxi in the Chinese context, 
and that this provides a countertendency to the expectation based on the general characteristics 
of SME managers and owners. One might also note that writing a letter to a bank would be 
unusual in a Chinese cultural setting. In other countries, the most popular communication 
channel was via telephone, ranging from 96% to 84% in usage. Only 11% of Chinese SMEs 
use e-mail or Internet banking and this is significantly lower than the comparators, where the 
figure ranges from 76% in Germany to 57% in the USA.  
 
 
Satisfaction with banks  
 
One key measure here is an SME’s expressed satisfaction with their banks service performance. 
A range of theory is relevant here. Service Management Theory (Grönroos, 1994) suggests that 
the customer’s perception of service quality is determined by a combination of the services 
actually provided (a technique dimension) and the interaction between customer and seller (a 
functional dimension). The Relationship Marketing Paradigm emphasises the whole process, 
from attracting to maintaining, and then enhancing the customer relationship, with further 
consequences for the firm’s reputation and image (Gummesson, 1996). In line with these 
theories, literature on the SME-bank relationship finds that SMEs initially have high 
expectations of their banks. They expect the bank to understand their needs, to treat them as a 
unique case, rather than in a standardised way (Lam and Burton, 2006), and they appreciate a 
bespoke service delivered by a bank officer advice able to constructively evaluate their business 
potential (Binks and Ennew, 1997; Adamson et al., 2003). As such, they expect something akin 
to the German model of relationship lending. Vegholm (2011) confirms that SME perception 
of their bank is influenced by a bank officers’ ability to adapt to SME clients’ needs and to 
provide useful advice. In addition, as the majority of SMEs are dependent on bank financing, 
the availability of bank loans is also closely associated with high degree of satisfaction 
(Vegholm, 2011).     
 
                                                          
20 In recent years, internet banking is exceptionally popular among young generation and professionals.   
Table 5: Comparison of SMEs communications with banks    
 China UK* 
 
USA* Germany* 
 
Hong Kong* 
 
Rank  % Rank  % Rank              % Rank % Rank % 
Visit branch  1 69 4 43    2                 78 3 62 4 47 
Telephone  2 51 1 84    1                 88 1 85 1 96 
Email or internet banking  3 11 2 58    3                 57 2 76 2 66 
Write a letter to bank  4 5 3 54    4                 29 4 30 3 50 
*Approximated numbers obtained from Berry (2006, page 44) and China data from own survey. 
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    Table 6 sets out our findings regarding SME satisfaction with the services provided by their 
bank(s).  
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Table 6: Comparison of satisfaction with bank  
 China 
Mean  
UK* 
Mean 
USA* 
Mean 
Germany* 
Mean 
Hong 
Kong* 
Mean 
Overall quality of service  3.3 4.0 4.4 4.0  3.7 
Availability of finance 3.4 3.9 4.2 3.7 3.6 
Range of services offered 3.4 3.9 4.3 3.7 3.7 
Competence of staff 3.2 3.9 4.3 3.8 3.7 
Speed and efficiency of services 3.3 3.9 4.3 3.8 3.7 
Main contact 3.7 3.9 4.3 3.8 3.8 
Level of understanding of  your 
business 
3.3 3.6 3.9 3.7 3.5 
Charges or tariffs 3.1 3.0 3.8 2.9 3.1 
Overall  3.3 3.8 4.2 3.7 3.6 
*Data from Berry (2006, page39). Scale: 1= Very dissatisfied to 5= Very satisfied and China data from own survey. 
    These items were measured by a 5-point Likert-scale from 1 “Very dissatisfied” to 5 “Very 
satisfied”. The table indicates that, apart from the items “Main contact” and “Charges or 
tariffs”, the China data exhibits a significantly lower mean for each item than the comparators. 
We can further classify the items into four categories: (1) Finance related satisfaction (i.e. 
“Availability of finance”); (2) Services related satisfaction (i.e. “Range of services offered” 
and “Speed and efficiency of services”); (3) Bank staff related satisfaction (i.e. “Competence 
of staff” and “Level of understanding of your business”) (4) Overall satisfaction (i.e. “Overall 
quality of service” and “Overall”).  
 
    The first three categories impact on the scores for overall satisfaction. If we refer back to 
some of the context claims set out in Section 2, the significantly lower scores here indicate that 
one reason for the reported rapid shifting by SMEs between banks and also the use of multiple 
banks in China is a poor quality of service that fails to meet expectations. One might infer then 
that in terms of banking services, Chinese banks are deficient.   
 
Bank financing problems 
 
Table 7 sets out the survey results for Chinese SMEs seeking external finance and places this 
data with the comparators.  
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Table 7: Comparison of banks as a source of finance    
 China 
% 
UK* 
% 
USA* 
% 
Germany* 
% 
Hong Kong* 
% 
External finance sought in last 3 years**  63 17 24 19 22 
From: Main bank  
          Other source 
          Both  
50 
19 
31 
37 
54 
9 
43 
36 
21 
57 
27 
16 
54 
23 
23 
Successful in full           34 89 92 81 80 
Successful in part  48 9 2 3 5 
Refused by financier(s)  16 0 0 5 7 
Refused by SME 2 0 2 3 2 
Did not know  0 2 4 8 6 
*Data from Berry (2006, page41) and China data from own survey. 
**For China, it meant between 2006/09 as we collected data in 2009/10; for other countries, it should be earlier than 2006 but Berry did not indicate it.    
 
 21 
 
    The findings indicate that over a 3 year period the demand for external finance by Chinese 
SMEs was significantly higher than that for the comparators. The data indicates that Chinese 
SMEs are far more likely to seek finance than their counterparts and significantly less likely to 
succeed in obtaining that finance. This finding is in line with other empirical studies of the 
availability of finance in China (see Gregory et al., 2000; Zeng, 2007). The finding highlights 
a potential funding gap. This gap is longstanding, a World Bank survey published in 2003 
found that only 6.63% of fixed assets and 9.65% of working capital of SMEs in China were 
financed by bank credit (cited in Yao and Yueh, 2009). A more recent report by Deloitte found 
that 70% of Chinese SMEs still face a finance gap (Deloitte, 2011). According to the 2013 
Survey on the Chinese Banking Industry ‘small loans’ still only accounted for 14.6% of the 
market in 2012.21 Given the dynamism of the Chinese economy and the increasing emphasis 
on the need to diversify the economy in the wake of the global financial crisis, this gap must 
be considered a matter of concern. According to the SMEs 2013 Annual Report, Chinese SMEs 
constitute 99.7% of registered enterprises, provide 80% of employee opportunities in 
cities/towns, and contribute 60% of gross domestic product (GDP), 50% of tax revenues, 65% 
of patents, 75% of technology innovations and 80% of new products.22  This concern is, 
however, one that is only partially recognized by Chinese SMEs. Table 8 suggests a series of 
ranked concerns for SMEs and find that access to finance is ranked only 6 of 9 different 
concerns. This, however, is a more central concern than is the case for the comparators. The 
findings are based on a question using a 10-point Likert-scale from 1 “Least important” to 10 
“Very important”. 
  
                                                          
21 “Survey on the Chinese Banking Industry, 2013” by KPMG.   
22China Economic Report, Issue 2. 2014, p. 61-67.  
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Table 8: Comparison of importance of business issues  
   China UK* USA* Germany* Hong Kong* 
   Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean 
Planning for the future 
of the business 
 
1 
 
6.7 
 
2 
 
7.5 
 
2 
 
8.1 
 
1 
 
8.0 
 
3 
 
7.3 
Access to new markets 2 6.6 6 6.0 4 6.9 5 6.7 4 7.1 
Achieving enough sales   3 6.5 1 8.2 1 8.2 2 7.8 1 7.4 
Competition from other 
firms  
4 6.0 5 6.4 5 6.8 6 6.6 1 7.4 
Finding and retaining 
skilled employees 
 
5 
 
5.7 
 
3 
 
6.7 
 
3 
 
7.0 
 
3 
 
7.6 
 
5 
 
6.9 
Access to finance  6 5.6 8 5.7 8 6.0 8 5.9 8 6.3 
Government or other 
regulation or red tape  
 
7 
 
5.5 
 
6 
 
6.0 
 
7 
 
6.1 
 
8 
 
5.9 
 
6 
 
6.7 
 The cost of finance 8 5.4 9 5.6 9 5.7 7 6.1 8 6.3 
The cost of employees 9 5.3 4 6.5 6 6.6 4 7.4 6 6.7 
A lack of business 
support or advice  
 
10 
 
5.2 
 
10 
 
5.0 
 
10 
 
5.1 
 
10 
 
5.0 
 
10 
 
6.1 
The cost of or finding 
suitable premises  
 
11 
 
3.8 
 
11 
 
4.6 
 
11 
 
4.2 
 
11 
 
3.4 
 
11 
 
5.8 
  *Data from Berry (2006, page55) and China data from own survey.  Scale: 1= Least important to 10= Very important.   
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    As a final point here, the findings regarding financing highlighted in Tables 7 and 8 
provide some context for the overall satisfaction scores in Table 6. They collectively suggest 
banking services in China are not meeting either needs or expectations.  
 
 
5. Concluding remarks  
 
Drawing on Berger and Udell’s (2006) conceptual framework, this study identified gaps in 
bank lending and services to SMEs in China in the context of some relevant comparators, i.e. 
Germany, the UK and the USA, and Hong Kong followed a stylised comparison. The results 
reveal that China has developed a banking infrastructure which is equivalent to comparable 
developed countries. This can be confirmed from the results such as the majority of surveyed 
Chinese SMEs have multiple banking relationships (though most prefer engaging with state-
owned commercial banks), and they have relatively high uptake on a wide variety of banking 
services. However in terms of the quality of bank services, China is deficient. The findings 
provide some evidence that there is a funding gap experienced by SMEs in China and that 
SMEs are poorly served by the current state of the banking system in China. For example, 
Chinese sample has the lowest score of satisfaction with their banks regarding to overall quality 
of service, availability of finance, range of services offered, competence of staff, speed and 
efficiency of services and bank officers’ understanding level of their businesses.  
 
    The findings suggest some policy implications. China in particular has a lending system that 
operates according to state influence and according to guanxi relations, which are rather 
different than the German relational lending model. SMEs are an important contributor to 
sustainable growth in China. SMEs exist in a finance and banking environment that is still in 
transition. The lending infrastructure is now more developed and diversified, though still 
dominated in a de facto sense by the state-owned banks. In 2012, six domestic banks (including 
4 state-owned) were among the world top 500 enterprises.23 The system has shifted from 
centralisation to partial decentralisation, from government absolute intervention to indirect 
intervention and influence. State owned banks still receive favourable treatment from the state. 
A non-performing loan problem still persists and other forms of bank still experience a 
discriminatory environment.24 The state, however, is committed to addressing the issues. In 
November 2013, the “Decision on a number of reform issues of the third plenum of the 
Eighteenth Central Committee of CCP”, determined that private small and medium sized banks 
/financial institutions may now be created, subject to strict monitoring.25 This may prove to be 
one of the most important financial reforms if it begins to contribute to a reduction in the 
discriminatory environment currently faced by SMEs.26  This, in turn, may begin to affect the 
currently adverse state of lending services. As such, it would be meaningful for future research 
to assess the impacts of these financial and institutional changes on lending infrastructure and 
services to SMEs from different perspectives.           
                                                          
23 “10 year ‘Nirvana’ of China’s banking sector”, China Economic Weekly, January 6, 2013. There is still only 
one big private bank - Minsheng Bank - established in 1996. 
24 NPLs rate dramatically reduced from 23.6% at the end of 2002 to 1.56% by the end of 2012 (China Economic 
Weekly, January 6, 2013) which results by the fact that the government pumped large new funds into SOCBs 
and the latter sold their NPLs to individuals at non-market price.    
25 “The gate to private banks is opening soon and banking sector is entering an era of differential operations”,         
Securities Times newspaper, March 10, 2014.  
26 “The highlights of China’s banking reforms in 2014”, Financial Times (FT. Chinese), February 11, 2014.   
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    The paper contributes to the body of knowledge in two ways: firstly, our stylised contrast 
makes China comparable with four other nations/regions to assess similarities and divergences 
in the lending facilities and banking services to SMEs, though there is a gap with regards to the 
points of data collection. Secondly, our in-depth discussions in the context of government 
policies, financial infrastructure, SME credit availability, and the intricacies of the SME-bank 
relationship between China and the comparators provides insights of the   similarities and 
divergences. However as with many other studies, this paper has a number of limitations with 
which the generalisation of the findings might be premature: (1) as noted in Section 3, the 
nature of Chinese sample is hardly justified to be representative considering China is 
geographically highly diverse in terms of economic and social development, as such finding 
generalisation could be problematic; (2) the analysis pattern had to be in line with Berry’s 
publication because of the nature of the study and therefore more advanced test (e.g. ANOVA, 
regression) could not be carried out. As such, the findings suggesting significant differences 
between China and other countries can only be presented in general term.     
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